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Abstract
Direct and indirect standardization procedures aim at comparing
diﬀerences in health or diﬀerences in health care expenditures between
subgroups of the population after controlling for observable morbidity
diﬀerences. There is a close analogy between this problem and the
issue of risk adjustment in health insurance. We analyse this analogy
within the theoretical framework proposed in the recent social choice
literature on responsibility and compensation. Traditional methods of
risk adjustment are analogous to indirect standardization. They are
equivalent to the so-called conditional egalitarian mechanism in social
choice. In general, they do not remove incentives for risk selection,
even if the eﬀect of non-morbidity variables is correctly taken into ac-
count. A method of risk adjustment based on direct standardization
(as proposed for Ireland) does remove the incentives for risk selection,
but at the cost of violating a neutrality condition, stating that insurers
should receive the same premium subsidy for all members of the same
risk group. Direct standardization is equivalent to the egalitarian-
equivalent (or proportional) mechanism in social choice. The conﬂict
between removing incentives for risk selection and neutrality is un-
avoidable if the health expenditure function is not additively separable
in the morbidity and eﬃciency variables.
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11 Introduction
As soon as the regulator imposes community-rating on a market of health
insurance, he creates incentives for undesirable risk selection. This is the
basic reason for introducing a so-called equalization fund or a system of
risk adjusted premium-subsidies (Newhouse, 1996; van de Ven and Ellis,
2000). The aim of risk adjustment (RA) is to compensate the insurers for
diﬀerences in the needs proﬁles of their members, while at the same time
keeping incentives for cost control. In practice, the ﬁnancial streams to and
from the equalization fund or the risk adjusted premium subsidies are derived
from observations on health care expenditures. Yet observed expenditures do
not only reﬂect diﬀerences in needs, but also diﬀerences in the cost eﬃciency
of the insurers. To get a good estimate of the former, one has to remove the
eﬀect of the latter. This immediately suggests that there is a close analogy
between risk adjustment and the issue of direct and indirect standardization,
which is analyzed mainly in the epidemiological literature. Indeed, direct and
indirect standardization procedures aim at comparing diﬀerences in health or
diﬀerences in average expenditures between diﬀerent groups after controlling
for observable morbidity diﬀerences, captured by variables such as age and
gender. The analogy with risk adjustment is clear as soon as the memberships
of the diﬀerent insurers are seen as the groups for which the health care
e x p e n d i t u r e sh a v et ob es t a n d a r d i z e d .
The relationship between diﬀerent methods of standardization on the one
hand and diﬀerent RA-systems on the other hand has not been analyzed in
the literature until now. As we will show, the main reason for this lack
of interest may be that almost all the existing systems (implicitly) use the
method of indirect standardization. This is true both for the so-called "in-
ternal" models of Germany and Switzerland and for the so-called "external
models" of the Netherlands, Belgium, Israel and the US Medicare system.
The choice for indirect standardization is not self-evident, however, and one
can ask how risk adjustment based on direct standardization would look like
and what are the relative advantages and disadvantages of both approaches.
The question becomes more relevant because the risk equalization procedure,
proposed in Ireland, is the proverbial exception on the general rule that risk
adjustment is based on indirect standardization. In fact, in the Irish system,
ﬁnancial streams to and from the equalization fund are based on the actual
costs of the insurers themselves and it has been claimed (Armstrong, 2006)
that this improves the incentives for eﬃciency for the contributing insurers,
2i.e. the insurers with a favorable needs proﬁle. We investigate (and reject)
this claim.
We analyze the problem of risk adjustment in a system of (social) health
insurance. Very similar issues arise in other systems with risk adjustment,
e.g. when a given budget has to be allocated over diﬀerent geographical
entities (Rice and Smith, 2001). One can easily argue that the problem of
individual risk selection is much less urgent in the latter systems, because it is
more diﬃcult (or nearly impossible) for local authorities to "select" individual
citizens. More emphasis should therefore be put on the (easier) problem of
equity at an aggregate level and less on incentives for individual risk selection.
Yet, in so far as there remains a problem of diﬀerential treatment of diﬀerent
groups of citizens because of ﬁnancial reasons, our results are also relevant
in a context of geographical allocation of resources.
Our analysis remains purely theoretical. We focus on the basic princi-
ples underlying both methods and analyze the incentives for risk selection
and eﬃciency in the hypothetical setting in which the regulator has perfect
information on the needs proﬁle of the members of the diﬀerent insurers. It
will turn out that even with perfect information the questions raised are not
trivial. Of course, in the real world the most urgent problems of risk selection
follow from the fact that the morbidity information used is far from perfect
and most attention goes precisely to the improvement of the informational
basis. Yet, while it is true that the problem we analyze is of second order for
policy makers, we still feel that our analysis throws an interesting light on
the structural features of diﬀerent risk adjustment systems.
The problem of risk adjustment is related to the issue of measuring in-
equity in health and in health care delivery. There also, one of the challenges
is to correct adequately for diﬀerences in needs, in this case between diﬀerent
socioeconomic groups. The choice between direct and indirect standardiza-
tion has been discussed in that setting by Wagstaﬀ and van Doorslaer (2000).
Our paper is even more closely related to Gravelle (2003), who argues that
direct standardization is the better approach to measuring income related
inequality in health, because indirect standardization leads to inconsistent
estimates. Some of our results are similar, but we focus less on the statistical
aspects. Moreover, we explicitly introduce a formal framework to analyze
incentives for risk selection and eﬃciency. This formal framework boils down
to a reinterpretation of the recent social choice literature on redistribution,
in which an explicit distinction is made between individual responsibility
and compensation characteristics (Fleurbaey and Maniquet, forthcoming).
3We believe that this framework should receive more attention in health eco-
nomics.1
In section 2 we introduce a simple model with two insurers and two risk
groups to explain the relationship between risk adjustment and indirect ver-
sus direct standardization. We show how traditional risk adjustment systems
coincide with the former, while the proposed scheme in Ireland coincides with
the latter. In section 3 we set up our theoretical framework for the evalu-
ation of RA-systems. We formalize the incentives for risk selection and for
eﬃciency and we analyze a number of popular solutions from the social choice
literature. It will turn out that it is generally impossible to reconcile diﬀer-
ent desirable features of the RA-system, even in the hypothetical situation
of perfect information. Sections 4 and 5 are the core of the paper, in which
we discuss the characteristics of indirect and direct standardization methods
respectively. We show that they represent diﬀe r e n tp o s i t i o n so nt h et r a d e - o ﬀ
between solidarity and eﬃciency. Section 6 concludes.
2 A simple model of standardization and risk
adjustment
Consider a situation with N individuals. Denote the health care expenditures
of individual i by Ei. We distinguish two needs groups, the old and the young,
indicated by the subscripts g = O,Y respectively. There are NO old and NY
young individuals in society, with NO + NY = N. There are two insurers A
and B, indicated by the superscripts s = A,B respectively. With a similar
notation we have NA+NB = N. The numbers of the old and the young who





Y .The share of subgroup g,i n s u r e db yi n s u r e rs, as a fraction of the
total population is given by ps
g =( Ns
g/N). Average expenditures in the two
groups, for the two insurers and for the respective subgroups are written in
an obvious notation as Es
g,s= A,B,g = O,Y. We assume that EO >E Y.2
1See Fleurbaey (2006) for a general treatment of health-related issues and Fleurbaey
and Schokkaert (2007) for an application to the measurement of inequity and inequality
in health and health care delivery.
2A warning concerning our notation is in place here to avoid confusion. Each time we
use the subscript i, we refer to variables at the level of the individual. In all other cases
the same variable refers to averages. Hence, Ei denotes the expenditures of individual i,
while E,EA,EB,E O and EY refer to average expenditures for the population and for the
4Using this notation, the average expenditures in the population are given
by


















This expression immediately shows that there are two possible causes for
diﬀerences between EA and EB. First, the two insurers may diﬀer in their
eﬃciency to control costs. This will be captured by diﬀerences in the ex-
penditures per need group, i.e. diﬀerences in (Es
O,Es
Y). Secondly, the needs
composition of their membership (ps
O/ps,p s
Y/ps) may diﬀer.
2.1 Modelling the risk adjustment (RA) system
Expenditures are ﬁnanced by insurers3. The regulator imposes that pre-
miums are community-rated, because premium diﬀe r e n t i a t i o no nt h eb a s i s
of health risks is considered unacceptable for equity reasons. As soon as
community-rating is imposed, however, there is a danger of explicit risk se-
lection by insurers: the better risks will in general be more proﬁtable, since
their actual expenditures will be lower than the average community-rated
premium. The aim of introducing a system of risk adjustment is precisely to
remove these incentives for risk selection through a system of premium sub-
sidies. However, in order to keep incentives for cost eﬃciency, these premium
subsidies should only reﬂect diﬀerences in needs and not diﬀerences in eﬃ-
ciency. Therefore, for each individual member i,t h er e g u l a t o rd e ﬁnes a level
of "acceptable costs" Ai, i.e. "the costs generated in delivering a speciﬁed
basic beneﬁts package containing only medically necessary and cost-eﬀective
care" (van de Ven and Ellis, 2000, p. 767). Premium subsidies should reﬂect
only these acceptable costs.
Broadly speaking, there are two ways of setting up a system of risk adjust-
ment.4 The ﬁrst is the "internal model" ,i nu s ei nS w i t z e r l a n da n dG e r m a n y .
diﬀerent subgroups respectively.
3We assume that out-of-pocket payments of the patients are zero. Alternatively, one
may interpret the expenditures Ei as expenditures net of out-of-pocket payments.
4See van de Ven and Ellis (2000) for a detailed description of diﬀerent models of risk
adjustment on health insurance markets. Institutional details of the system in diﬀerent
European countries can be found in van de Ven et al. (2003).
5In this model all the ﬁnancial means are collected by the insurers through
their community-rated premiums. In principle, insurers for which As <E
should pay into the central fund, while insurers for which As >Eshould
receive from the fund. However, there is a budget condition to be satisﬁed.
Denoting ﬁnancial streams to and from the fund by S, this budget condition




i Ei, the budget constraint will auto-
matically be satisﬁed for Si = Ai − E. If this is not the case, imposition of
the budget constraint requires some adjustment to the acceptable costs level
Ai. We will denote these "adjusted" acceptable costs by ωint








int,s − E (3)
After paying to or receiving from the fund, the net average ﬁnancial cost for




s = E +( E
s − ω
int,s) (4)
showing that premium diﬀerences between insurers will only reﬂect diﬀer-
ences between actual cost and acceptable costs, i.e. diﬀerences in eﬃciency.
In the alternative "external model" of risk adjustment (implemented in
the Netherlands, in Belgium, in Israel and in the U.S. Medicare system), a
central fund collects the ﬁnancial means (e.g. through social security con-
tributions) and pays premium subsidies to the individual insurers. These
premium subsidies then correspond to the acceptable costs. We denote the




i Ei, all health care ex-
penditures are covered through premium subsidies. In practice, however, Ω
will be smaller than total expenditures and the diﬀerence (
P
i Ei−Ω)h a st o
be covered by the insurers through community-rated premiums. To simplify
matters, we will neglect this feature and assume that Ω =
P
i Ei.I n t r o d u c i n g
this simpliﬁcation boils down to adding or subtracting an irrelevant constant
to all expressions below and does not change any of our conclusions. We
will then denote the premium subsidy for individual i in the external model
by ωext








i .T h e r e i s n o w a
perfect analogy between the internal and the external model. We will there-
fore drop the superscripts "int" and "ext" and denote acceptable costs for
individual i by Ai and adjusted acceptable costs (and premium subsidies) for
individual i by ωi. In the sequel we will also use
πi = ωi − Ei (5)
6as a shorthand notation for the "proﬁtability" of member i in a system of
community rating.
Where do the acceptable costs come from? In principle they could be
based on an external judgment of what is "medically necessary and cost-
eﬀective care". In practice, however, they are always based on observed
expenditures. Yet it would make no sense to simply equate acceptable costs
Ai with observed expenditures Ei. As was made clear in eq. (2), diﬀerences
in observed expenditures reﬂect both diﬀerences in needs and diﬀerences in
eﬃciency - and the whole idea of risk adjustment is that diﬀerences in ac-
ceptable costs should only reﬂect the former. Therefore the eﬀect of the
latter diﬀerences should be removed from Ei. This way of formulating the
problem shows the clear analogy between "deﬁning acceptable costs" on the
one hand and the epidemiological literature on direct and indirect standard-
ization on the other hand. When applied to medical care expenditures, these
standardization procedures aim at comparing diﬀerences in average expen-
ditures between diﬀerent groups after controlling for diﬀerences in needs, or,
alternatively, aim at checking whether individuals at the same needs level
end up with an identical amount of care, irrespective of the group to which
they belong. In our setting the relevant "groups" are the two insurers. Let
us now introduce both methods of standardization in this setting.
2.2 Indirect standardization
The indirect standardization method transforms expenditures by applying
an exogenously given standard level of expenditure to the actual popula-
tion structure of the group. Analogous to (2), the indirectly standardized















Y refer to the expenditure standards. A common choice for










Applying this idea to the risk adjustment problem, it is striking that
equations (6) and (7) remove diﬀerences in "eﬃciency" by construction, while
diﬀerences in needs proﬁle are kept. One can therefore immediately equate
the acceptable costs to the indirectly standardized expenditures, i.e. deﬁne
7As,ind = Es,ind. In general, as explained before, one will still have to adjust
these acceptable costs in order to satisfy the budget constraint. However,





and, using (4), the premium contribution to be raised by insurer s becomes
P
s,ind = E + E
s − E
s,inda (9)
While, as far as we know, the literature on risk adjustment does not refer
to the issue of standardization, this indirect procedure boils down exactly
to the traditional method of risk adjustment as implemented in practice. In
fact, in the internal models of countries like Switzerland and Germany, the
population is divided in groups which are homogeneous with respect to needs.
Average expenditures are calculated for each of the corresponding cells and
taken as the standard. In our model with two risk groups, this boils down to
choosing
ωO = EO (10)
ωY = EY
The average premium subsidies at the level of the insurer are then given
by the weighted average of the expressions in (10), which gives immediately






s − pO)EO +( p
s
Y/p
s − pY)EY. (11)
In the external models the usual starting point is a regression equation of
expenditures on needs factors (and needs factors only). Acceptable costs are
deﬁned as the expenditures predicted by these equations. In a linear model
with the sum of disturbances equal to zero, this of course also boils down to
an application of (10).
2.3 Direct standardization
The alternative direct standardization method is less known in the risk ad-
justment literature. It transforms expenditures by applying a standard needs
8proﬁle to the actual expenditure proﬁle of the group. Directly standardized











and, in the special case where the average needs proﬁle in the population is







We will further focus on case (13). Diﬀerences between insurers in these
directly standardized expenditures can only be due to eﬃciency diﬀerences,
since the needs proﬁle is kept constant. Therefore, these diﬀerences should
be reﬂected in the community rated premiums of the insurers. On the other
hand, if for insurer s actual expenditures are larger (smaller) than directly
standardized expenditures, this necessarily reﬂects a worse (better) needs
proﬁle. This suggests to deﬁne contributions to and from the fund as (Es −
Es,dira).
However, as before this speciﬁcation does not necessarily satisfy the bud-
get constraint. Two adjustment procedures readily suggest themselves. The















In both cases we arrive at pA e EA,dira + pB e EB,dira = E. We will discuss both
procedures in section 5. For the moment, we leave this choice open and we use
the general notation e Es,dira to indicate budget-adjusted directly standardized
expenditures. This then leads to the following deﬁnition for the contributions
to and from the fund
S
s,dira = E
s − e E
s,dira (16)
As before, acceptable costs are deﬁned as the average expenditures plus
the "acceptable" diﬀerences. Interpreting (16) as these acceptable diﬀerences
yields
ω
s,dira = E + E
s − e E
s,dira (17)
9which is to be compared with (8). Moreover, using (4) and (17) we obtain
P
s,dir = e E
s,dira (18)
which can be compared with (9). Note that eq. (18) perfectly reﬂects the
idea that diﬀerences between insurers in directly standardized expenditures
are due to eﬃciency diﬀerences and should therefore be reﬂected in the com-
munity rated premiums.
As noted before, this direct standardization approach is less known in
the risk adjustment literature. To the best of our knowledge, there is only
one real-world example: the proposed (but hotly debated) scheme in Ireland.
Under the Irish equalization scheme insurers either contribute to or receive
payments from the solidarity fund based upon their own cost distribution,
rather than that of the market (Armstrong, 2006). This is exactly the system
described in eqs. (13) and (16). The budget constraint is satisﬁed in the Irish
system through a proportional adjustment (15).
We can now formulate the basic questions of this paper. How to interpret
the diﬀerences between the indirect and the direct standardization methods
in the context of risk adjustment? Are there conditions under which they
coincide? If they lead to diﬀerent premium subsidies, what are their relative
advantages and disadvantages? Is the empirical dominance of the indirect
standardization method a reﬂection of its theoretical superiority?
3 A theoretical framework for evaluating risk
adjustment systems
To evaluate the two approaches, we need a theoretical framework formalizing
the basic principles underlying the system of community-rating with risk
adjustment. In Schokkaert et al. (1998) and Schokkaert and Van de Voorde
(2004), we argued that the problem of risk adjustment is formally similar to
the treatment of redistribution in the social choice literature on responsibility
and compensation (Fleurbaey and Maniquet, forthcoming). We ﬁrst brieﬂy
r e p e a tt h em a i nf e a t u r e so ft h i sa p p r o a c hi na b s t r a c tt e r m sa n dt h e na p p l y
it to a simple linear model along the lines described in the previous section.
103.1 Responsibility and compensation
Given the setting of the problem, it is obviously necessary to distinguish two
sets of explanatory factors in the expenditure equation. We therefore write:
Ei = f(Ci,R i) (19)
where Ci refers to "compensation" variables (related to morbidity) and Ri
refers to "responsibility" variables (related to the eﬃciency of the insurers).
We assume that there is a monotonic positive relationship between expendi-
tures and the level of Ci and Ri. The whole point now is to derive acceptable
costs Ai (or ωi)f r o mt h ei n f o r m a t i o na b o u tEi in such a way that the in-
centives for risk selection are removed, while the incentives for eﬃciency are










The incentives of insurers can be represented using the "proﬁtability"
(5) of the diﬀerent individuals in a system of community rating. These
diﬀerences in relative proﬁtability may reﬂect diﬀerences in eﬃciency: in that
case they are not problematic from a social point of view. However, they
may also reﬂect diﬀerences in morbidity. To focus on the latter, consider
two individuals i and j with Ri = Rj, i.e. diﬀering only in morbidity (or
compensation) variables. If πi >π j,i ti sp r o ﬁtable for an insurer to attract
individual i rather than individual j. This immediately creates the danger of
unequal treatment of these two individuals in terms of open risk selection or
diﬀerentiated supply of service quality. This is exactly what we try to avoid
through the RA-system. This crucial condition to remove the incentives for
risk selection, or more generally, the incentives for diﬀerential treatment, can
be formalized as follows6:
Condition 1 NO INCENTIVES FOR RISK SELECTION (NIRS). Take
any two individuals with Ri = Rj. Then the RA-system should be such that
πi = πj.
5Remember that this implies an innocuous simpliﬁcation in the case of the external
model, where in reality
P
i ωi = Ω <
P
i Ei. Because we introduced this simpliﬁcation,
the following expressions are simpler than the analogous expressions in Schokkaert et al.
(1998) and Schokkaert and Van de Voorde (2004).
6As noted before, our analysis focuses on social health insurance systems. Its relevancy
for the issue of risk-adjusted geographical allocation of resources depends on the relevancy
of condition NIRS in the latter setting.
11Of course, condition NIRS can be satisﬁed in many diﬀerent ways. As
an obvious example, consider a system in which ∀i, ωi = Ei and, therefore,
∀i, πi =0 . This clearly removes all incentives for risk selection, but it implies
the simple reimbursement of all expenditures and would therefore destroy all
incentives for eﬃciency. As mentioned before, diﬀerences in expenditures will
also reﬂect diﬀerences in eﬃciency between diﬀerent insurers, which should
not lead to larger premium subsidies. A simple condition to formalize this
requirement is that insurers should get the same premium subsidy for two
individuals i and j with the same health care needs, irrespective of possible
diﬀerences in expenditure following from eﬃciency diﬀerences:
Condition 2 NEUTRALITY (NEUT). Take any two individuals with Ci =
Cj. Then the RA-system should be such that ωi = ωj.
The interpretation of condition NEUT is straightforward. It is instru-
mental in introducing incentives for eﬃciency. Indeed, applying (5) and the
assumption of monotonicity of (19), it follows from NEUT that
πi <π j ∀i,j with Ci = Cj and Ri >R j,
i.e. increases in eﬃciency (keeping morbidity constant) lead to increases
in proﬁtability. More eﬃcient insurers can therefore enjoy their eﬃciency
advantage. Of course, this simple conclusion only holds in a system of strict
community rating by insurers. Moreover, even then it is only a minimal
condition for eﬃciency, neglecting all considerations of quality diﬀerentials
and costs of expenditure control for the insurers. This is the reason why
we prefer to give the condition a less ambitious neutrality interpretation.
Formulated as such, however, it seems a very intuitive and straightforward
condition.
While it can be argued easily that respect of conditions NIRS and NEUT
is not suﬃcient to have an adequate RA-system, we think that they both
are strongly desirable. The following result from the social choice literature
is therefore rather worrying:
Lemma 3 (Fleurbaey, 1994,1995) If the medical expenditure function f(.)
is not additively separable in C- and R-variables, then no risk adjustment
scheme can satisfy both NIRS and NEUT (if N > 4).
12Note that this result holds under the condition that the regulator has
perfect information about (19). It is therefore not a traditional second best-
result. Its intuition can be grasped as follows. Consider four individuals
I, J, K and L with individual characteristics (e c,e r), (e c,r), (c,e r)a n d( c,r)
respectively. Condition NIRS then requires (see (5))
ωI − ωK = f(e c,e r) − f(c,e r) (21)
ωJ − ωL = f(e c,r) − f(c,r)
On the other hand, NEUT requires that ωI = ωJ and ωK = ωL.T h i si m p l i e s
t h a tt h ee x p r e s s i o n sa tt h eR H So f( 2 1 )h a v et ob ee q u a l .I ti se a s i l ys e e nt h a t
this can only be true if the expenditure function f(.) is additively separable
in the compensation and responsibility variables, i.e. if it can be written as
f(Ci,R i)=g(Ci)+h(Ri). In all other cases there is a basic conﬂict between
NEUT and NIRS and compromise solutions will have to be sought.
In fact, for the additively separable case, Bossert (1995) and Bossert and









It is easy to check that this mechanism satisﬁes NEUT and the budget con-
dition (20). It also satisﬁes NIRS. This immediately follows from the fact








h(Rk) − h(Ri) (23)
is independent of the level of Ci.
Compromise solutions for the non-additively separable case have been
proposed by (among others) Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) and were already
reinterpreted for the problem of risk adjustment in Schokkaert et al. (1998).
A ﬁrst possibility is to pick a member from the family of so-called conditional
egalitarian solutions, deﬁned for a freely chosen benchmark value f R as:
ω
CE
i = f(Ci, e R)+( 1 /N)
X
k
(f(Ck,R k) − f(Ck, e R)) (24)
Note that the second term is a constant, introduced so as to satisfy (20).
Diﬀerences in the premium subsidies between diﬀerent individuals can only
13follow from the ﬁrst term in (24). It is therefore obvious that (24) satisﬁes
NEUT. Applying (5) yields
π
CE
i = f(Ci, e R) − f(Ci,R i)+( 1 /N)
X
k
(f(Ck,R k) − f(Ck, e R)) (25)
This expression shows that πCE
i in general will depend on the level of Ci.
Therefore, NIRS is not satisﬁed and there may be incentives for risk selection.
If one wants to satisfy NIRS, but not necessarily NEUT, one can choose a
member from the family of so-called egalitarian equivalent solutions, deﬁned
for a freely chosen benchmark value e C as:
ω
EE
i =( 1 /N)
X
k
f(e C,Rk)+f(Ci,R i) − f(e C,Ri) (26)
The ﬁrst term in (26) is identical for all individuals and gives average expen-
ditures in the hypothetical situation in which everybody would be character-
ized by the same level of health risk e C.Diﬀerences in individual expenditures
following from diﬀerences between Ci and e C are then taken care of by the
remaining terms in (26). This diﬀerence will in the general case depend
on the level of Ri: therefore the egalitarian-equivalent mechanism does not




i =( 1 /N)
X
k
f(e C,Rk) − f(e C,Ri) (27)
does not depend on the level of Ci.
The social choice literature (Fleurbaey and Maniquet, forthcoming) gives
a full axiomatic characterization of these (and other) solutions. We do not
discuss these theoretical results here. For our purposes it is suﬃcient to
mention that the conditional-egalitarian mechanism (24) goes as far as pos-
sible in removing the incentives for risk selection while satisfying NEUT. The
egalitarian-equivalent mechanism (26) goes as far as possible in the direction
of NEUT without conﬂicting with NIRS. It is easy to see that in the ad-
ditively separable case, both mechanisms always coincide with the natural
solution (22), satisfying both NIRS and NEUT.
The solutions described until now are by far the most popular in the
social choice literature. Note that both the egalitarian-equivalent and the
conditional-egalitarian mechanism implement an additive correction so as to
14satisfy the budget constraint. This is obvious in (24) for the latter. It is also
clear for the former if we rewrite (26) as
ω
EE
i =( 1 /N)
X
k








An alternative mechanism (analyzed by Iturbe-Ormaetxe, 1997) replaces
this additive correction by a proportional adjustment so as to satisfy the
budget constraint. He calls this the "proportional solution with exogenous
reference point e C" and deﬁnes it as
ω
PROP
i =( 1 /N)
X
k






which is directly comparable to (28). It follows that
π
PROP
i =( 1 /N)
X
k






Inspection of (29) and (30) shows that the proportional solution does not
satisfy NEUT, but does satisfy NIRS. It shares these properties with the
egalitarian-equivalent mechanism.7 However, contrary to the egalitarian-
equivalent (and the conditional-egalitarian) mechanism it does not become
independent of the choice of the reference value e C (respectively e R)i nt h e
case of additive separability.8 It therefore does not in general reduce to the
natural solution in the case of additive separability. In fact, it is easily seen
that this will only occur for a speciﬁcc h o i c eo fe C. For later reference, we
summarize this result as a lemma:
7Both mechanisms are characterized (see Bossert and Fleurbaey, 1996 and Iturbe-
Ormaetxe, 1997) through axioms which are stronger than NIRS, and therefore imply NIRS.
Not surprisingly, they are called "additive solidarity" and "multiplicative solidarity" re-
spectively in Fleurbaey and Maniquet (forthcoming). We do not go into the interpretation
of these axioms, as they are not very intuitive in the context of risk adjustment.
8The result of the proportional model with exogenous reference point is independent
of the choice of the reference value in the case of multiplicative separability, i.e. if the
expenditure function can be written as f(Ci,R i)=g(Ci)h(Ri). This condition is less
interesting in our context, however.
15Lemma 4 (Iturbe-Ormaetxe, 1997; Fleurbaey and Maniquet, forthcoming).
If the expenditure function is additively separable in the C-a n dt h eR-variables,
i.e. if it can be written as f(Ci,R i)=g(Ci)+h(Ri), the proportional solu-
tion with exogenous reference point coincides with the natural solution for a
reference point e C satisfying the condition g(e C)=( 1 /N)
P
k g(Ck).
3.2 Application to a simple model of medical expendi-
tures
Let us now return to our simple model with two insurers A and B and two
risk groups O and Y . Real-world risk adjustment schemes are based on
cell-means or on simple linear regression models to explain medical expen-
ditures. To keep the mathematics as simple as possible (without losing any
essential insights) we will therefore adopt in the sequel the following linear
speciﬁcation:9
Ei = E0 + αCi + βRi + γCiRi (31)
The variable Ci is a binary variable with Ci =1for the old and Ci =0for
the young. In the same way, Ri is a binary variable with Ri =1for insurer
A and Ri =0for insurer B. Starting from (31), we get




The interpretation of the parameters is obvious. The parameter α (> 0)
captures the diﬀerence in costs directly related to morbidity diﬀerences be-
tween the old and the young, β (> 0) is a general eﬃciency factor capturing
the lower overall cost eﬃciency of insurer A. The parameter γ (> 0)i sd i f -
ferent from zero if there is in addition a diﬀerentiated eﬃciency eﬀect, i.e. if
insurer A is relatively less eﬃcient for the old as compared to the young.10
If γ =0 , eq. (31) becomes additively separable and the natural solution (22)
is applicable. If γ 6=0 , the compromise solutions introduced in the previous
9We do not include a disturbance term in eq. (31). Therefore, it is best to interpret
this speciﬁcation as an expected expenditures equation. Another possibility is to see the
disturbance term as included in either the Ci or the Ri-variable. Some theoretical results
about the treatment of the disturbance term have been discussed in Schokkaert et al.
(1998).
10The following analysis does not all depend on the sign of γ.
16subsection have to be implemented. Introducing eq. (31) in equations (24),
(25), (26), (27), (22) and (23), the following deﬁnitions follow immediately.
Deﬁnition 5 (CE). If expenditures are given by (31), the conditional egali-
tarian RA-subsidies are given by
ω
CE





O + e R(Ci − pO)
i
(33)








O + e R(Ci − pO) − CiRi
i
(34)
Conditional-egalitarian RA-subsidies satisfy NEUT, but they do not satisfy
NIRS.
Deﬁnition 6 (EE). If expenditures are given by (31), the egalitarian equiv-
alent RA-subsidies are given by
ω
EE
i = E0 + αCi + βp
A + γ
h








A − Ri)+γ e C(p
A − Ri) (36)
Egalitarian-equivalent RA-subsidies satisfy NIRS, but they do not satisfy
NEUT.
Deﬁnition 7 (NATURAL SOLUTION). If expenditures are given by (31)
with γ =0 , the natural solution to deﬁning RA-subsidies yields
ω
NAT
i = E0 + αCi + βp
A (37)




A − Ri) (38)
The natural solution satisﬁes both NIRS and NEUT.
We can also deﬁne the proportional solution with exogenous reference
p o i n tb yi n t r o d u c i n g( 3 1 )i n( 2 9 )a n d( 3 0 )t oa r r i v ea t
17Deﬁnition 8 (PROP). If expenditures are given by (31) the proportional
solution with exogenous reference point e C yields
ω
PROP
i =2 E0 + α(pO + Ci)+β(p
A + Ri)+γ(p
A
O + CiRi) (39)
−
E0 + αpO + βpA + γpA
O
E0 + αe C + βpA + γ e CpA(E0 + αe C + βRi + γ e CRi)







E0 + αpO + βpA + γpA
O
E0 + αe C + βpA + γ e CpA(E0+αe C+βRi+γ e CRi)
(40)
The proportional solution satisﬁes NIRS, but does not satisfy NEUT. In the
case of additive separability, it reduces to the natural solution for the speciﬁc
choice of e C = pO.
To understand the last sentence, note that a comparison of (39) with
37) immediately shows, as expected, that the proportional solution with ex-
ogenous reference point does not automatically reduce to the natural solu-
tion in the case of additive separability (γ =0 ). It does so, however, for
e C = pO. This is a simple application of lemma 4, since with eq. (31),
g(Ci)=E0 + αCi.11
4 Indirect standardization and conventional
risk adjustment
The stage is now set for a closer investigation and comparison of the direct
and indirect standardization methods, as applied to risk adjustment. Let
us ﬁrst consider the conventional approach, which is equivalent to indirect
standardization. In the ﬁrst subsection, we show that this is a particularly
inadequate model if one does not explicitly control for the correlation between
the R-a n dC-variables. In the second subsection, we argue that keeping the
philosophy of indirect standardization while controlling for diﬀerences in the
R-variable leads us to the conditional egalitarian model.
11The constant E0 is irrelevant and could also have been included in h(Ri).
184.1 Inconsistent estimates. The explicit versus the
conventional model
As was described before, the conventional method of risk adjustment de-
ﬁnes acceptable costs as cell means for homogeneous needs groups or as the
predicted expenditures from an equation containing only needs factors. This
procedure is equivalent to the traditional method of indirect standardization.
Using (31) to compute (10) yields
ωO = E0 + α +( N
A
O/NO)(β + γ) (41)
ωY = E0 +( N
A
Y /NY)β
It is obvious that the acceptable costs in (41) satisfy NEUT. A ﬁrst insight
into further features of this solution can be gained by focusing on the addi-
tively separable case. Comparing (41) for γ =0with (37) makes clear that
the conventional model does not coincide with the natural solution. If we
want to avoid incentives for risk selection, the diﬀerence ωO −ωY should re-
ﬂect the diﬀerence in expected costs between the old and the young, which in
this simple case is given by α. The expressions (41) show that this condition
is not satisﬁed in the conventional RA-method, unless (NA
O/NO)=( NA
Y /NY),
which would imply that the C-a n dR-variables are distributed independently
in the population. An intuitively attractive way of interpreting this result
is to see it as a problem of omitted variables in an estimation exercise. In
fact, the conventional model uses observations of expenditures to estimate
the eﬀect of Ci. This estimate will be biased if we do not adequately control
for the variation in Ri.T h eβ-terms in eqs. (41) exactly represent this omit-
ted variables-bias. This interpretation was already discussed and empirically
illustrated for the case of risk adjustment by Schokkaert and Van de Voorde
(2004, 2006). An analogous result is described by Gravelle (2003) in the
context of measuring income related inequality in health.
Since the diﬀerence between ωO and ωY does not adequately capture
the morbidity-related diﬀerences in expected costs, it is not surprising that
the conventional method of risk adjustment runs into problems with the
incentives for risk selection. This ﬁnding is summarized in the following
proposition, the proof of which is given in the appendix.
Proposition 9 The traditional risk adjustment model is equivalent to con-
ventional indirect standardization. It does satisfy NEUT. However, if needs
and eﬃciency variables are not independently distributed in the population, it
19does not satisfy NIRS, i.e. it does not remove the incentives for risk selection,
even if the expenditure function is additively separable in C- and R-variables.
Proof. See appendix.
It is striking that the conventional approach to risk adjustment does not
remove the incentives for risk selection, even in the case of an additively sepa-
rable expenditure function, in which there should be no problem in principle.
Since the problem is due to the failure to take into account explicitly the ef-
fects of the R-variables, it is inherent to the conventional model of indirect
standardization (7), in which the "standard" levels of expenditures are taken
to be the simple averages EO and EY. However, one can still work within the
basic philosophy of indirect standardization, while taking another approach
to deﬁning the "standard" level of expenditures E∗
O and E∗
Y in (6). An ob-
vious alternative consists in ﬁrst estimating (31) with all variables included,
so as to get unbiased estimates of the eﬀects of morbidity and eﬃciency. In
the next step one then deﬁnes acceptable costs as the predicted expenditures
from this equation with neutralization of the eﬀects of the eﬃciency variables
by ﬁxing them at a benchmark level. A similar procedure has been proposed
by Gravelle (2003) in the context of measuring income related inequality in
health.12 It is called the "explicit model" of risk adjustment in Schokkaert
and Van de Voorde (2006) and they show that the resulting premium subsi-
dies satisfy NIRS in the additively separable case.13 Let us now look at the
characteristics of this explicit approach to indirect standardization.
4.2 Indirect standardization and the conditional egal-
itarian mechanism
The most obvious choice of a benchmark level for calculating the acceptable
costs in the explicit approach is to take the average of R,w h i c hi sg i v e nb y
pA in our simple model. For this choice, (unadjusted) acceptable costs can
12Gravelle (2003)’s notion of "essential non-linearity" coincides with what we call the
lack of additive separability. While he also proposes to ﬁx the standardizing variables
across individuals (as we do), he does not discuss the normative consequences of this
choice.
13The explicit approach is followed in Belgium where "medical supply" is included in
the regression equations to explain medical expenditures but removed for the calculation
of the acceptable costs (Schokkaert and Van de Voorde, 2003). It is also followed in the
regional allocation formula proposed by Gravelle et al. (2003).
20be written as
AO = E0 + α + p
A(β + γ) (42)
AY = E0 + p
Aβ
I ti so b v i o u st h a tt h ee x p r e s s i o n si n( 4 2 )s a t i s f yN E U T .I ti sw o r t h w h i l ec o m -
paring (42) with the conventional model (41). The two are only equivalent
if NA
O/NO = NA
Y /NY = pA, i.e. if the young and the old are distributed
proportionally over the two insurers. In the additively separable case γ =0 ,
eq. (42) now yields AO−AY = α, i.e. the direct morbidity eﬀect is estimated
in an unbiased way.
Less obvious are the characteristics of (42) if the expenditure function
is not additively separable. However, the procedure of choosing a reference
value for the R-variable suggests a direct analogy with the conditional egali-
tarian solution. Going through some straightforward algebra shows that the
analogy is perfect. We summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 10 (a) The (explicit) method of indirect standardization is equiv-
alent to implementing the conditional egalitarian model for e R = pA.I f t h e
expenditure function is not additively separable in C- and R-variables, it sat-
isﬁes NEUT but it does not satisfy NIRS (and hence creates incentives for
risk selection). (b) If the expenditure function is additively separable in C-
and R-variables, the (explicit) method of indirect standardization yields the
natural solution, which satisﬁes both NEUT and NIRS.
Proof. See appendix.
In general, the acceptable costs deﬁn e di n( 4 2 )d on o ts a t i s f yt h eb u d g e t
constraint. In fact, as shown in the proof of the proposition, the diﬀer-
ence between total expenditures and total acceptable costs (42) is equal to
γ(NA
O − NOpA). Therefore, an adjustment will be needed unless the expen-
diture function is additively separable (γ =0 )o rNA
O = NOpA, i.e. both
insurers have the same needs proﬁle.14 To arrive at the conditional egali-
tarian solution, we have to adjust the acceptable costs in (42) through an
additive correction, i.e.




14Of course, this speciﬁc result depends on the choice of the reference value pA for the
eﬃciency variable.
21We can now summarize the basic result of this section as follows. As soon
as the expenditure function is not additively separable in C-a n dR-variables,
the indirect method of standardization, underlying almost all the existing
RA-systems in the world, does not satisfy NIRS. This means that, even
with perfect information, it cannot remove the incentives for risk selection,
neither in its conventional nor in its explicit form. The policy relevancy of
this result depends on the empirical importance of the interaction eﬀects
between C-a n dR-variables. It has been shown in Schokkaert and Van de
Voorde (2004) that these interaction eﬀects may be not only statistically
but also economically signiﬁcant. The result in proposition 10 can therefore
not be discarded as a mere theoretical curiosity. Moreover, lemma 3 shows
that we face here a very basic contradiction: if one wants to respect NEUT,
one cannot respect NIRS. Yet, NEUT is a straightforward requirement and
in most countries political reality excludes the possibility of introducing a
system in which diﬀerent premium subsidies would be given to individuals
in the same (acceptable) risk category.
5 Direct standardization as an alternative?
For those who give a high priority to the avoidance of risk selection, the re-
sults in the previous section are rather worrying. Apparently the traditional
methods of risk adjustment based on the indirect method of standardiza-
tion cannot remove the incentives for risk selection. The question now arises
whether direct standardization oﬀers an attractive alternative. As discussed
in section 2, one will in general have to adjust directly standardized expen-
ditures in order to satisfy the budget constraint. The Irish system uses the
proportional adjustment rule (15). We will postpone the discussion of that
rule until the second subsection. We ﬁrst focus on the theoretically more
straightforward procedure in which -as before with indirect standardization-
the additive adjustment (14) is implemented.
5.1 Imposing the budget constraint: the additive ap-
proach
Implementing the method of direct standardization amounts to introducing
the information from eq. (31) in the equations for directly standardized
expenditures (13), in the additive adjustment rule (14), in the streams to
22and from the equalization fund (16) and in the deﬁnition of acceptable costs
(17). This requires some tedious algebra. At the end, it turns out that the
method of direct standardization with an additive adjustment to satisfy the
budget constraint leads to the egalitarian-equivalent model:
Proposition 11 (a) The (additively adjusted) method of direct standard-
ization is equivalent to implementing the egalitarian equivalent model for
e C = pO. If the expenditure function is not additively separable in C- and
R-variables, it satisﬁes NIRS (and hence removes the incentives for risk se-
lection) but it does not satisfy NEUT. (b) If the expenditure function is ad-
ditively separable in C- and R-variables, the (additively adjusted) method of
direct standardization yields the natural solution, which satisﬁes both NEUT
and NIRS.
Proof. See appendix.
Although this result is not trivial, it is not really surprising when we
look at the formal structure of the direct standardization approach and com-
pare it with the egalitarian-equivalent mechanism. In both cases, we take
a benchmark value for the needs: the overall average needs proﬁle in (13),
the reference value e C in (35). These benchmark values are consistent with
the ﬁnding that the method of direct standardization is equivalent to the
egalitarian equivalent mechanism for e C = pO.
On the other hand, the result in proposition 11 goes against the intuition
that basing the ﬁnancial streams to and from the equalization fund on the
actual costs of the insurers themselves improves the incentives for eﬃciency
for the contributing insurers (Armstrong, 2006). However, it is clear that this
intuition is indeed one-sided: one could as well claim that the incentives for
eﬃciency for the receiving insurers are diluted if the ﬁnancial stream coming
from the equalization fund is based on their own actual costs. Proposition
11 shows that the latter eﬀect dominates if the expenditure function is not
additively separable in the morbidity and the eﬃciency variables.15
The potential of the direct standardization method to remove the incen-
tives for risk selection comes at a cost. As is clear from (35) the egalitarian-
equivalent mechanism does not satisfy NEUT. In our speciﬁc setting this
means that the insurers get diﬀerent premium subsidies (have a diﬀerent
15Remember that all these statements are derived for the situation of perfect informa-
tion.
23level of acceptable costs) for the same risk groups. In fact, it follows from











Insurer A gets more than insurer B for its old members and less for its young
members, so as to compensate for the fact that it is relatively less eﬃcient
for its old16 - and given that we aim at removing fully the incentives for a
diﬀerential treatment between the old and the young. Formulated as such, it
is pretty obvious that the chances are minimal that the egalitarian-equivalent
mechanism would be accepted in the political process, provided that its con-
sequences are well understood. The procedure with direct standardization
and ﬁnancial streams to and from an equalization fund is not very transpar-
ent, however. For those who like the egalitarian-equivalent mechanism, it is
like a "clever" way to hide its consequences with respect to NEUT.
All this is only relevant if the expenditure function is not additively sepa-
rable. Indeed, combining propositions 10 and 11, we can immediately derive
the following corollary:
Corollary 12 If the expenditure function is additively separable in C- and
R-variables, the (additively adjusted) method of direct standardization and
the (explicit) method of indirect standardization are equivalent. They both
reduce to the natural solution.
Note that the equivalence in the corollary is not between direct standard-
ization and the conventional method of indirect standardization but between
direct standardization and what we called the explicit method of indirect
standardization. As is clear from the discussion of proposition 9, the con-
ventional method does not adequately take into account the eﬀects of the
eﬃciency-related variables, even in the case of additive separability.
As noted before, the mechanism described in this section is not the mecha-
nism that is proposed in Ireland. To arrive at the egalitarian-equivalent mech-
anism we implemented the additive correction (14). The proof of the proposi-
tion shows that the additive correction needed is equal to γ(pA
O−pOpA).T h i s
is identical to the correction we had to introduce in the (explicit) model of
16Note that, obviously, the diﬀerences in (44) become zero if the speciﬁce ﬃciency eﬀect
disappears, i.e. if γ =0 .
24indirect standardization. As before, no adjustment will be needed if the ex-
penditure function is additively separable (γ =0 )o ri fNA
O = NOpA,i . e .b o t h
insurers have the same needs proﬁle.17 Although the theoretical framework
rather suggests to apply an additive correction, proportional adjustments are
quite popular in practice. This is also what is proposed in Ireland. Let us
now turn to that system.
5.2 Imposing the budget constraint: the proportional
approach
We can follow the same procedure as in the previous subsection, but with
substitution of the proportional adjustment rule (15) for the additive rule in
the model of direct standardization. The analogy between the two methods
is so close, however, that it will come as no surprise that the proportionally
adjusted method of direct standardization is equivalent to the proportional
solution with exogenous reference point:
Proposition 13 (a) The (proportionally adjusted) method of direct stan-
dardization is equivalent to implementing the proportional solution with ex-
ogenous reference point e C = pO.I t s a t i s ﬁes NIRS, but it does not satisfy
NEUT. (b) Even if the expenditure function is additively separable in C- and
R-variables, the result of the (proportionally adjusted) method of direct stan-
dardization in general does depend on the choice of e C. For the linear model
(31), however, the choice of e C = pO yields the natural solution.
Proof. See appendix.
The Irish model of risk adjustment (equivalent to the proportional so-
lution with exogenous reference point) has therefore similar features as the
egalitarian-equivalent solution. It removes the incentives for risk selection at
the cost of violating NEUT. The choice between the proportional and the
additive adjustment rule may therefore not be very crucial in the real-world
policy debate. There are some (perhaps minor) arguments in favor of the
additive adjustment. First, the idea of egalitarian-equivalence has by now
already a long tradition18 and plays an important role as a reference point
17This speciﬁc result again depends on the choice of the reference value pO for the
morbidity variable.
18It basically originated with Pazner and Schmeidler (1978).
25in the theoretical analysis of other distribution problems with a more com-
plicated structure than the quasi-linear speciﬁcation used here (Fleurbaey
and Maniquet, forthcoming).19 Second, the link with the attractive natural
solution in the case of additive separability is much closer with the additive
correction than with the proportional one. As noted before, the egalitarian
equivalent solution is independent of the value chosen for e C and reduces to
the natural solution as soon as the expenditure function is additively sepa-
rable and whatever the functional form of g(Ci) and h(Ri).O nt h ec o n t r a r y ,
the last statement in proposition 13 is crucially dependent on the extremely
simple speciﬁcation of the expenditure function (31), as is made clear by
lemma 4. In the everyday practice of risk adjustment (with cell means or
linear regressions) the notion of additive separability is more relevant than
the one of multiplicative separability.
6C o n c l u s i o n
T h e r ei sac l o s ea n a l o g yb e t w e e no nt h eo n eh a n dt h em e t h o d so fd i r e c ta n d
indirect standardization, used in the epidemiological literature and in the
literature on equity in health (care), and on the other hand the issue of risk
adjustment in health insurance. Indeed, the notion of "acceptable costs"
in risk adjustment basically refers to standardized expenditures. We have
argued that traditional methods of risk adjustment are analogous to indirect
standardization. In its conventional interpretation they do not adequately
control for the eﬀects of eﬃciency variables and therefore lead to biased
estimates of the morbidity eﬀects. However, even in an explicit model in
which these non-morbidity eﬀects are controlled for, they do not remove
incentives for risk selection. A method of risk adjustment based on direct
standardization (as proposed for Ireland) does remove the incentives for risk
selection, but at the cost of violating a neutrality condition, stating that
insurers should receive the same premium subsidy for all members of the same
risk group. This latter ﬁnding is hidden because of the rather intransparent
nature of the ﬁnancial streams to and from th ee q u a l i z a t i o nf u n di nt h i s
model.
To analyze these issues, we exploited another analogy: that between risk
adjustment and responsibility-sensitive redistribution, as analyzed in the re-
19The model used here can be seen as quasi-linear, because the result of interest (πi in
eq. (5)) can be written as ωi − f(Ci,R i).
26cent social choice literature on fair allocations. Direct standardization is
equivalent to the egalitarian-equivalent mechanism which was already pro-
posed by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978). Indirect standardization with the
explicit model is equivalent to the conditional egalitarian mechanism. The
proportional (instead of additive) adjustment proposed for Ireland leads to
the so-called proportional solution with exogenous reference point. All these
solutions have been axiomatically characterized (Fleurbaey and Maniquet,
forthcoming). We believe that the application of this literature to health
economics issues is a fruitful area of future research. More speciﬁcally, in
t h i sp a p e rw ew o r k e dw i t hav e r ys i m p l em o d e lw h e r ee ﬃciency diﬀerences
are immediately linked to insurers. A broader approach should integrate
the relations with (and the responsibility of) providers and patients in the
C-a n dR-variables. Moreover, a full analysis should go beyond the static
ﬁrst best-setting of this paper and integrate in a coherent way behavioral
reactions.
We have shown that the conﬂict between removing incentives for risk se-
lection and neutrality is unavoidable if the health expenditure function is not
additively separable in the morbidity and eﬃciency variables. This suggests
that the prospects for solidarity are bleak, since a solution where diﬀerent
insurers receive diﬀerent premium subsidies for individuals within the same
risk group, does not look politically realistic. In fact, as stated, the problem
is hidden in the equalization process in the Irish system. While there is in
principle no problem to implement the egalitarian-equivalent mechanism in
the external model (through an explicit regression analysis), this necessarily
will lead to a broader discussion about the trade-oﬀ between solidarity (or
equity) and eﬃciency. If the choice is restricted to the conditional egalitarian
mechanism because of the sacrosanct character of NEUT, an interesting re-
search question is the choice of the best value for e R, minimizing the incentives
for risk selection20.
The analysis in this paper is set in a context in which the regulator
has perfect information about the diﬀerent variables inﬂuencing health care
expenditures and can therefore distinguish the eﬀects of morbidity and ef-
ﬁciency. On the one hand, this is the main strength of our approach. It
is very striking indeed that the basic conﬂict between removing incentives
for risk selection and neutrality appears even in a setting with perfect infor-
20Some results on this question with respect to the problem of income redistribution are
presented in Luttens and Van de gaer (2007).
27mation. This ﬁnding suggests that there is a deep incompatibility between
the diﬀerent notions. On the other hand, it is also a basic limitation of
this paper. It would be interesting to investigate the characteristics of the
diﬀerent solutions in a model in which the regulator has imperfect informa-
tion and is confronted with information asymmetries. This requires a full
formal treatment of the eﬀects of missing variables and an explicit interpre-
tation of the disturbance term in the health expenditure equation in terms
of responsibility and compensation. Moreover, it remains true that the most
important challenge for the regulators in the real world is the improvement
of the informational basis for deriving the RA-scheme. An advantage of the
approach followed in this paper is that it allows to build a bridge between
this econometric work of estimating expenditure models and the theoretical
and normative issues concerning the best speciﬁcation of the RA-formula.
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29PROOFS
Proof of proposition 9.
Applying the method of indirect standardization (7) and (10) to the ex-
penditures as speciﬁed in (31) yields
AO =( N
A
O/NO)(E0 + α + β + γ)+( N
B
O/NO)(E0 + α) (45)
= E0 + α +( N
A
O/NO)(β + γ)
AY = E0 +( N
A
Y /NY)β
It is easy to check that with these deﬁnitions the budget constraint is
satisﬁed, i.e. the sum of acceptable costs equals total expenditures. No
correction is needed and we can deﬁne
ωO = AO
ωY = AY
This immediately shows that the method satisﬁes NEUT.
Let us now check NIRS. Introducing (45) and (31) in the expression for































































Both insurers will have incentives for risk selection unless (a) γ =0 ; AND
(b) NA
O/NO = NA
Y /NY. Additive separability is not suﬃcient to remove the
incentives for risk selection. It is moreover necessary that the young and the
old are distributed proportionally over both insurers, i.e. that there are no
diﬀerences in the needs proﬁles of both insurers. ¥
30Proof of proposition 10.
In the explicit model of indirect standardization, the adjusted cell means
are calculated as in (42), repeated here for the sake of convenience:
AO = E0 + α +( β + γ)p
A (46)
AY = E0 + βp
A
In order to satisfy the budget constraint the sum of acceptable costs has to
be equal to total expenditures. This will not necessarily be the case with the
deﬁnitions (46). In fact, it is easily seen that the diﬀerence between total
expenditures and total acceptable costs is given by
NE− NOAO − NYAY (47)





E0 + α +( β + γ)p
A¤






where we used eqs. (32) and (46).
Therefore an adjustment will be needed, unless the expenditure function
is additively separable (γ =0 )o rNA
O = NOpA. Implementing an additive









and we therefore get










Comparing these expressions with equations (33) in the main text shows
immediately that the explicit model of indirect standardization coincides with
the conditional egalitarian model for e R = R = pA. All the other statements
in the proposition immediately follow. ¥
Proof of proposition 11.
Introducing the information from eq. (31) in the deﬁnition (13), we get
E
A,dira =( E0 + α + β + γ)pO +( E0 + β)pY (50)
= E0 + β +( α + γ)pO
31and, analogously,
E
B,dira = E0 + αpO (51)
To check the budget constraint, we calculate the diﬀerence between total
expenditures and total directly standardized expenditures. Using eqs. (32),
















This expression is equal to (47). Again, an adjustment will be needed, unless
the expenditure function is additively separable (γ =0 )o rNA
O = NOpA.
As in the case of (explicit) indirect standardization the necessary additive
correction will be equal to (48), and we therefore get
e E









where the superscript "add" refers to the additive adjustment. It is easy to
see that average expenditures of both insurers are given by
E












Contributions to and from the equalization fund are given by (16). Sub-
tracting (52) from (53) gives
S
a,dira,add =( α + γ)(N
A
O/N












Note that these expressions become zero, i.e. that there are no streams to
and from the fund, if NA
O/N A = NB
O/N B = pO.T h i si sa si ts h o u l db e ,s i n c e
in that case the needs proﬁle of the membership of both insurers is identical.
We can now calculate the acceptable costs for both insurers by adding
(54) to (32) (see deﬁnition (17)). This yields
ω







A − pO + p
ApO) (55)
ω






32These are acceptable costs formulated at the insurer level. In order to link
them to acceptable costs at the level of the individuals, we have to take into













Eq. (56) is consistent with the acceptable costs (55) for the following
deﬁnitions of acceptable costs at the level of the individuals:
ω
A
O = E0 + α + γ + βp
A + γpO(p
A − 1) (57)
ω
A










Y = E0 + βp
A + γpOp
A
Comparing these expressions with the deﬁnition of the egalitarian-equivalent
mechanism in (35) shows that the method of direct standardization with
additive adjustment coincides with the egalitarian-equivalent mechanism for
e C = C = pO. All the other statements in the proposition then follow imme-
diately. ¥
33Proof of proposition 13.
We exploit the relationship between the method of direct standardiza-
tion and the egalitarian-equivalent mechanism as described in the proof of




i =( 1 /N)
X
k








Within our model of health care expenditures, the ﬁrst term in this expression
is E, the second term is Ei. The last term is the additive correction to satisfy
the budget constraint and it is identical for all individuals. Call it COR to
simplify the notation. Computing the average value for insurer s we then get
ω






where the summation is over individual members of insurer s. Since Ri is
identical for all individual members of the same insurer, we can substitute
f(e C,Rs) for f(e C,Rs) for all members of insurer s. Comparing (59) to (17),
we see that
e E




s,dira = f(e C,R
s)
Using (50) and (51) gives
f(e C,R
s)=E
s,dira = E0 + αpO + βR
s + γpOR
s
showing immediately that e C = pO.
Applying the proportional adjustment rule (15) yields
e E
s,dira,prop =
E0 + α + βpA + γpA
O
E0 + αpO + βpA + γpOpA(E0 + αpO + βR
s + γpOR
s) (60)
Using (53), (31) and (60) in (17) the resulting deﬁnition of acceptable
costs under direct standardization with proportional adjustment coincides
with (39) for e C = C = pO. The other statements in the proposition immedi-
ately follow. ¥
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